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vs. Case No. 16865 




APPEAL FROM VERDICT AND JUDGMENT 
OF THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, HONORABLE 
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR., JUDGE 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is a personal injury case arising from a 
rear-end collision involving vehicles driven by appellant 
and respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury on November 29 and 
20, 1979. At the close of evidence, appellant was granted 
a directed verdict by the court as to respondent's liability. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant for 
$1,000.00 in general damages, $686.73 in special medical 
damages and $100.00 for loss of earnings. Subsequent to 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial, appellant made a motion for additur or new trial, 
claiming that the damage verdict was inadequate. Said 
motion was denied by the trial court. Further, respondent 
made a motion for set-off as to reimbursement paid to 
appellant's insurer for no-fault benefits received by 
appellant prior to trial. The court granted said motion 
for set-off as to medical and loss of earnings payments 
and denied the same as to a set-off against the general 
damages award for loss of services reimbursement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order denying appellant's 
appeal, affirming the damages verdict of the jury and 
awarding to respondent a set-off against the general dam-
ages verdict for reiwbursenent paid to appellant's insurer 
for household services payments. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The issue of liability was sufficiently clear to 
the court that the court directed a verdict in favor of the 
appellant and against the respondent at the conclusion of 
the evidence. 
Respondent asserts that appellant's statement of 
facts concerning testimony as to appellant's alleged 
injuries, course of medical treatment and alleged expenses 
both medicals and lost wag.es, is misleading in that the 
appellant makes reference to medical treatment by Dr. 
Isaacson, Dr. Jean Wayman, chiropractor, medical testimony 
-2-
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by Dr. Thomas Soderberg and physical therapy by Larry Brown, 
R.P.T. Also appellant has made reference to statements 
made by various doctors and other persons giving medical 
treatment. Appellant has referred to the treat~ent given 
and doctors who have allegedly treated the appellant, when 
at the time of trial appellant failed to produce the 
chiropractor, Dr. Jean Wayman, the physical therapist, 
Larry Brown or Dr. Isaacson and produced only Dr. Thomas 
Soderberg. Dr. Soderberg first saw the appellant eight 
months after the accident and saw her only twice on August 9, 
1978 and again on August 23, 1978. Appellant was then not 
seen again by Dr. Soderberg for over a year, until the 22nd 
day of September, 1979. 
Appellant produced no testiwDny from a doctor 
indicating that the appellant could not work because of 
injuries sustained as a result of the accident. The only 
testimony to this fact was the testimony of the appellant. 
Appellant further testified that during this period of time 
she was having emotional problems arising from a divorce, 
that she had remarried and that her husband had had a heart 
attack, requiring her to leave the area. 
The evidence, primarily the medical records of 
Dr. Soderberg, illustrate the personal problems not related 
to the accident which the appellant had. Said problems are 
pointed out in the medical records of Dr. Soderberg dated 
November 7, 1979. It is stated therein that the appellant was 
-3-
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having tension because her husband had disappeared and had 
not been found for a week. 
The testimony at the time of trial further showed 
that the appellant was being treated simultaneously by the 
chiropractor, Dr. Jean Wayman, and by Dr. Soderberg. Dr. 
Soderberg was not aware that the appellant was receiving 
chiropractic treatments at the same time that she was receiv-
ing physical therapy treatments at the request of Dr. 
Soderberg. On some occasions the appellant received physical 
thereapy and chiropratic treatments on the same day or within 
a day or so of each other. 
The jury returned a verdict for general damages 




NEITHER ADDITUR NOR NEW TRIAL IS 
APPROPRIATE IN APPELLANT'S CASE 
Respondent does not challenge the assertion by 
appellant that this court, in appropriate circumstances, 
may order additur contingent upon acceptance by a defendant 
or, alternatively, the granting of a new trial. Such was 
the order of the Supreme Court of Utah in Bodon v. Suhrmann, 
8 Utah 2d. 35, 327 P.2d 826 (1958), relied upon by the 
appellant. 
However, the circumstances warranting additur are 
narrowly drawn. Additur or a new trial is proper only when 
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the damage award is inadequate due to having been arrived 
at by the jury under influence of passion or prejudice or 
when the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict or 
the verdict is against the law. 
No claim is made by appellant, nor could one be 
sustained, that the verdict herein was inadequate because 
the jury acted under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
Nor was the verdict against prevailing law. 
The only basis for challenging the damages award 
herein is that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict, or, to more clearly state the proposition proffered 
by appellant, that the verdict is inadequate in light of the 
evidence presented as to damages. 
Consequently, this court is asked to consider 
the weight to be accorded the verdict of a jury which was 
fully apprised of the evidence as to damages sustained by 
the appellant and which was arrived at on the basis of proper 
instructions. 
In the case of Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P.2d 179 
(1978), plaintiff appealed from a jury verdict, claiming the 
damage award was inadequate. The Utah Supreme Court, in 
affirming the amount of the award stated: 
"The award of damages may be 
less than the plaintiff wished or 
even less than we would have found 
had we been the jury; but it is the 
prerogative of the jury to make the 
determination of damages and we 
cannot substitute our judgment for 
that of the fact finder unless the 
-5-
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evidence compels a finding that 
reasonable men and women would, 
of necessity, come to a different 
conclusion." 575 P.2d at 180 
Similarly, in the case of Schneider v. Suhrmann, 
8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822, (1958), a companion case to 
Bodon v. Suhrmann, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"Cases dealing with the revie·w 
of damages found by a jury, with 
invariable consistency, recite the 
reluctance of courts to interfere 
with such verdicts if there is any 
reasonable basis in the evidence -
upon which they can be sustained. 
This is based partly upon the often 
referred to advantages the fact 
trier has in being in immediate 
contact with the trial, the parties 
and the witnesses. In addition 
thereto, the question of damages for 
personal injuries involving the in-
tangibles of pain and suffering, 
with respect to which reasonable 
minds are apt to differ greatly, are 
matters which a jury is peculiarly 
adapted to determine. 327 P.2d at 
825 
The court in Schneider then affirmed the jury 
verdict awarding the plaintiff $2,000.00 general damages as 
a result of contracting trichinosis fron sausage sold by 
the defendant. 
The law does not contemplate upsetting a jury 
verdict merely because the plaintiff's expectation as to 
the a9propriate award of damages is not fulfilled. The 
jury is and should be entitled to give whatever weight it 
chooses to the plaintiff's evidence as to the extent of 
injury and reasonableness of the claiMs concerning medical 
treatment and loss of earnings. 
-6-
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The jury verdict in the instant case may be 
set aside only if this court concludes that reasonable 
minds would, of necessity, have differed from the jury in 
this case in their conclusion as to the proper anount of 
damages to be awarded. 
Respondent asserts that the verdict awarding 
appellant $1,000.00 general damages, $686~73 in medicals 
and $100.00 loss of earnings is well within the range of 
reasonableness. Appellant is not entitled to any presump-
tion that the jury accept appellant's evidence as to 
damages nor as to the credibility of appellant's witnesses. 
In fact, the only direct medical evidence produced by 
appellant was the testimony of Dr. Soderberg who first 
treated appellant some eight months after the accident. The 
balance of appellant's evidence as to medical treatment, 
medical expenses and lost wages was in the form of self-
serving declarations by appellant and hearsay statements 
of physicians and physical therapists. 
Respondent urges the court to deny appellant's 
request for additur or in the alternative, for a new trial. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO A SET-OFF 
FOR HOUSEHOLD SERVICES PAYMENTS PAID 
TO APPELLANT 
Section 31-41-11 (a), Utah Coce Annotated (1953), 
requires that a defendant's insurer reimburse a plaintiff's 
insurer for any no-fault benefits paid to plaintiff pursuant 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. Further, 
subsection (b) of the same statute provides for binding 
arbitration between insurers to settle the amount of such 
reimbursement. 
In the case before the court, respondent's insurer 
prior to trial ?aid to appellant's insurer the SQm of 
$494.09 as medical expenses, $1,200.00 for loss of earnings 
and $708.00 for loss of household services. Those sums 
represented the amounts paid by. appellant's insurer as no-
fault benefits and were accepted as reimbursement of same 
by said insurer. The jury verdict herein awarded the 
plaintiff the sum of $1,000.00 in general damages, $686.73 
as special damages for medical expenses and the sum of 
$100.00 as special damages for loss of earnings._ The trial 
court, at respondent's request, awarded a set-off for the 
medical payments reimbursement and loss of earnings reinburse-
ment, leaving a balance due appellant of $192.64 for special 
medical damages. The court refused to award respondent a set-
off against the general damages verdict for the $708.00 
reimbursement paid by respondent's insurer to appellant's 
insurer for no-fault household services payments to 
appellant. 
Respondent contends that the language of Section 
31-41-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953), mandates a set-off 
aoainst aooellant's verdict for all amounts paid by 
~ - -
respondent's insurer as reimbursement of personal injury 
-8-
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protection benefits paid to appellant, includins the house-
hold services payments. 
The clear intent of the Utah No-Fault Act is to 
provide for reimbursement of losses, but not to allow a 
double recovery for those losses by a plaintiff who accepts 
no-fault benefits and attempts to ciaim in addition thereto 
any corresponding sums awarded by jury verdict. 
The Utah Supreme Court dealt with the effect of 
the Utah No-Fault Act in connection with claims for no-fault 
benefits in the case of Jones v. TransaRerica Insurance 
Com?any, 592 P.2d 609 (1979). In that case, plaintiff was 
paid by his insurer the sum of $365.63 in medical expenses 
and $567.89 in disability benefits. Some eighteen months 
later, plaintiff submitted additional claims for payment 
for loss of services of $4,380.00 and for loss of earnings 
of $2,485.36. Defendant Transamerica Insurance Company 
refused to pay those claims and, in the meantime, plaintiff 
settled with the tortfeasor for the sum of $6,000.00. 
Plaintiff then brought suit against Transamerica Insurance 
Company for the subsequent amounts claimed for loss of 
services and earnings. The Utah Supreme Court, in affirm-
ing the summary judgment of the trial court denying 
plaintiff's claims for additional payment stated that the 
no-fault act was designed to eliminate small injury claims 
by providing automatic payment and further: 
"No-fault benefits are also avail-
able to those who sustain greater 
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injuries. This is so even though 
they remain free to pursue a tort 
claim as well. However, this does 
not entitle one to a double recovery 
for a single loss since the statute 
specifically affords subrogation 
rights and arbitration between the 
insurers whenever no-fault benefits 
are paid. 
"A fortiori, the legislative intent 
specifically expressed in the Act it-
self to 'possible stablize, if not 
effectuate certain savings in, the 
rising costs of automobile accident 
insurance and to effectuate a more 
efficient, ·equitable method of handl-
ing the greater bulk of the personal 
injury claims that arise out of auto-
mobile accidents' negatives the 
contention that double recovery is 
permitted. Double recovery for a 
single item of loss was never contem-
plated by the legislature and we will 
not permit any type of automatic re\•lard 
or 'windfall' to an injured plaintiff. 
592 P.2d at 611. 
Under the rationale of Jones, supra, defendant 
is entitled to a set-off against the jury verdict for the 
$708.00 paid as reimbursement for loss of household services 
as '•Jell as for the medical expense and loss of earnings 
payments. 
Further, the holding of this court in Allstate 
v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980), that a tort-victim's recovery 
from the liability insurer cannot be reduced by the amount 
of no-fault benefits paid has no application in the instant 
case, inasmuch as, prior to trial herein, appellant's insurer 
received full reimbursement for household services payments 
made to appellant and appellant presented evidence at trial 
-10-
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as to loss of household services, seeking to recover for the 
same. In Ivie, supra, the court found that an injured party 
should plead only for those damages for which he has received 
no reparation under his no-fault insurance. 
By virtue of the decisions in Jones, supra, and 
Ivie, supra, the no-fault act prohibits double recovery of 
any amounts payable under the act, including loss o.f house-
hold services. Since the only source available in this 
case for setting off the loss of services payments is the 
general damages award, respondent is entitled to a credit 
against that award in the sum of $708.00, representing the 
amount paid by respondent's insurer to appellant's insurer. 
Appellant should be barred from recovering any sum 
from respondent which is duplicative of payments accepted by 
appellant's insurer as reimbursement for no-fault benefits . 
. ? 6 
/ DATED this ·>, day of June, 19 80. 
' )"": I :_~--"I ---·-----· ._i. ·~~ :_ .. ~ ... _ .. _···~) 
FRANK N. KARRl\.S 
Attorney for Respondent 
321 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to James E. Hawkes, 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, 301 Bump & Ayers Building, 
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~day of June, 1980. 
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